1968-12-30 Special Meeting - Laserfiche WebLink

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• Hon. Mayor and City Commissioners - 3 i December 30, 1968 consideration of which is paid from the city treasury, or by an assessment levied by an ordinance or resolution of the city council, nor be the surety of any person having a contract, work or business with said city, for the per- formance of which security may be required, nor be the surety on the official bond of any city officer. Acts 1875, p. 154; G.L. Vol. 8, P. 526." In a dual office holding case, the Texas Supreme Court, in the 1880 case of State v. DeGress, 53 Tex. 387, held that the office of mayor of the City of Austin "cannot legally be held by one who at the same time continues an officer of the Army of the United States, though on the retired list." The City Charter of the City of Austin at that time provided that "No person shall be mayor (of the City of Austin) who at the time of his election is not possessed of the qualifications required for an alderman, or who holds any lucrative office under authority of the United States or any State ." C~ Officeholders are limited to holding only one office by the provisions of some municipal charters. 39TJ 2d, "Municipal Corporations," Sec. 146. In a very recent case, the Ft. Worth Court of Civil Appeals interpreted a provision of the charter of the City of Ft. Worth, which reads as follows: "***If a member of the Council shall become a candidate for nomination or election to any public office, other than that of Councilman, he shall immediately forfeit his place in the Council.***" The Court held, after reviewing appellant's attack against this provision of the charter, as being repugnant to the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the 14th Amendment, and the Texas Constitution and Texas Bill of Rights, "We could write at length, but believe it sufficient to say that we find nothing in either the Federal or State Constitu- tions which expressly or impliedly would prohibit efficacy of the quoted Charter provision, or which would inhibit its enforcement..." Willis v. City of Ft. Worth, et al, Tex.Civ.App., 1964, 380 SW2d 814, error refused, N.R.E. A t ough both of these cases involve dual office holding, as distinguished from a prohibition against office holding by a city employee, I believe that the same principles of law would apply in both cases. I find no Texas case directly in point on the question of prohibition of outside office holding by a city employee. Antieau, in his work, Municipal Corporation Law, makes the following statement on restrictions upon activities of municipal officers and employees: ~J