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1991-12-09 Public Hearing, Citizens Participation Meeting, and Regular Meeting
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1991-12-09 Public Hearing, Citizens Participation Meeting, and Regular Meeting
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City Meetings
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City Council
Meeting Doc Type
Minutes
Date
12/9/1991
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<br />D <br /> <br />FIRST LIHERAN CHURCH v. LOS ANGlES COUNTY <br /> <br />Syllabus <br /> <br />as a remedy Cor "temporary" regulatory takings-those regulatory <br />takings which are ultimately invalidated by the courts-is properly pre- <br />sented in this case. In earlier cases, this Court was unable to reach the <br />question because either the regulations considered to be in issue by the <br />state courts did not effect a taking, or the factual disputes yet to be <br />resolved by state authorities might still lead to the conclusion that no <br />taking had occurred. Here, the California Court of Appeal assumed <br />that the complaint sought damages for the uncompensated "taking" of all <br />use of Lutherglen by the ordinance, and relied on the California Supreme <br />Court's Agins decision for the conclusion that the remedy for the taking <br />was limited to nonmonetary relief, thus isolating the remedial question <br />for this Court's consideration. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo <br />CCYUnty, 477 U. S. -; Williamson Ccyunty Regional Planning <br />Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172; San Diego Gas &: Electric <br />Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621; and Agim, all distinguished. pp. 5-8. <br />2. Under the Just Compensation Clause, where the government has <br />"taken" property by a land-use regulation, the landowner may recover <br />damages for the time before it is finally detennined that the regulation <br />constitutes a WWdng" of his property. The Clause is designed not to <br />limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but <br />rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interfer- <br />ence amounting to a taking. A landowner is entitled to bring an action <br />in inverse condemnation as a result of the self-executing character of the <br />constitutional provision with respect to compensation. While the typi- <br />cal taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the <br />exercise of its power of eminent domain, the doctrine of inverse con- <br />demnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur with- <br />out such Connal proceedings. "Temporary" regulatory takings which, <br />as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in <br />kind from pennanent takings for which the Constitution clearly requires <br />compensa.tion. Once a court detennines that a taking has occurred, the <br />government retains the whole range of options already available-:- <br />amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation,oor exercise of eminent domain. But where the government's activities <br />have am~ady worked a taking of all use ot property, no subsequent action <br />by the government oan nlllvl It ot thl duty to provldl oompenlltlon tor <br />the period durlnlJ whloh the takJnl WAl IfTloUvl. (nvalhlaUon ot thl <br />ordinance without payment 01 fair value for the use of the property <br />during such period would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy. <br />pp. 9-16. <br /> <br />Reversed and remanded. <br />
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