1991-12-09 Public Hearing, Citizens Participation Meeting, and Regular Meeting

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e 85-l199-0PINION e 6 FIRST LUTHERAN CHURCH v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ation of the remedial question in those circumstances, we concluded, would be premature. The posture of the present case is quite different. Appel- lant's complaint alleged that "Ordinance No. 11,855 denies [it] all use of Lutherglen," and sought damages for this depri- vation. App. 12, 49. In affinning the decision to strike this allegation, the Court of Appeal assumed that the complaint sought "damages for the uncompensated taking of all use of Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855." App. to Ju- ris. Statement A13-A14 (emphasis added). It relied on the California Supreme Court's Agins decision for the conclusion that "the remedy for a taking [is limited] to nonmonetary re- lief. . .." Id., at A16 (emphasis added). The disposition of the case on these grounds isolates the remedial question for our consideration. The rejection of appellant's allegations did not rest on the view that they were false. Cf. M acDon- aid, Sommer & Frates, supra, at -, n. 8 (California court rejected allegation in the complaint that appellant was de- prived of all beneficial use of its property); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 259, n. 6 (same). Nor did the court rely on the theory that regulatory measures such as Ordinance No. 11,855 may never constitute a taking in the constitutional sense. Instead, the claims were deemed irrelevant solely because of the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins that damages are unavailable to redress a "temporary" regu- latory taking. II The California Court of Appeal has thus held 'It has been urgeci that the California Supreme Court's discussion of the compensation question in Agins v. Tibunm, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2cr25 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), was dictum, because the court had already decided that the regulations could not work a taking. See Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 703 F. 2d 1141, 1147 (CA9 1983) ("extended dictum"). The Court of Appeal in this case consid- ered and rejected the possibility that the compensation discussion in Agins was dictum. See App. to Juris. Statement A14-A15, quoting Aptos Sea- scape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138 Ca!. App. 3d 484, 493, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 195 (1982) ("[I]t is apparent that the Supreme Court itself did not intend its discussion [of inverse condemnation as a remedy for a taking]