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<br />e <br /> <br />e <br /> <br />Page 2 <br /> <br />Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. MW-93 <br /> <br />The school board generally has discretion to determine whether a particular <br />payment is 'necessary in the conduct of the public scho,ols.' However, in our <br />opinion the board may not as a matter of law pay the expenses of persons who <br />have no responsibilities or duties to perform for the board and whose connection <br />with public school matters is based solely on their relationship of blood, <br />marriage, or frienship with a board member. You have submitted no facts <br />indicating that the presence of a school board memberfs spouse, relative or <br />other associate at a convention will serve school purposes. The presence of <br />these persons at a convention appears to be purely social. Although a spouse's <br />presence at a convention may facilitate personal contact among administrators <br />and thus contribute in some small way to school purposes, we believe the benefit <br />accruing to the school district is too minimal to sustain the expenditure. Cf. <br />Warwick v. United states, 236 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Va. 1964) (deductibility from <br />federal income tax return of a wife's travel expenses). <br /> <br />We note that Attorney General Opinion H-1089' (1977) concluded that spouses of <br />public officials could in some cases receive free transportation on state-owned <br />aircraft where space is available. Whether this benefit could be provided <br />legally depended in part on the nature of the office, on the spouse's <br />traditional role, and the spouse's connection with a particular trip. This <br />opinion must be limited to its facts, and you have presented no facts and we are <br />aware of none which would establish a public purpose served by the spouse's <br />attendance at a convention. <br /> <br />You next ask whether school board members who received payments for expenses <br />incurred by non-members should be required to reimburse the school district. <br />Where payment is made from public funds under mistake of law, the public body <br />may seek reimbursement. City of Taylor v. Hodges, 186 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1945); <br />Cameron County v. Fox, 2 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Cornm. App. 1928, jdgmt adopted). <br />This provides an exception to the general rule that money paid under a mutual <br />mistake of law may not be recovered. City of Taylor v. Hodges, supra; Gould v. <br />City of El Paso, 440 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1969, writ ref'd <br />n.r.e.); Nunn-Warren Pub. Co. v. Hutchinson County, 45 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. ' Civ. <br />App.--Amarillo 1932, writ ref'd). Compare County of Galveston v. Gorham, 49 <br />Tex. 279 (1878); Stegall v. McLennan County, 144 S.W.2d 1111 (Tex. Civ. App.-- <br />Waco 1940, writ dism. jdgmt cor.). Although the court in Hayward v. City of <br />Corpus Christi, 195 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. Civ. App.--Waco 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.) <br />stated in dicta that interest payments made by a city under mistake of law could <br />not be recovered, its decision actually rested on the ground that the statute of <br />limitations barred recovery. Thus, the schoo~ board has authority to require <br />reimbursement of travel expenses illegally paid. See also Educ. Code ~ 23.26(a) <br />(trustees may sue and be sued). <br /> <br />*10734 As a general rule, school trustees have broad powers of control and <br />management over the school district, and the courts will not interfere unless a <br />clear abuse of power and discretion appears. Nichols v. Aldine Ind. School <br />Dist., 356 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston 1962, no writ): Kissick v. <br />Garland Ind. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1959, writ <br />ref'd n.r.e.). Where the school board members themselves have received <br /> <br />Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original u.s. Govt. works <br />